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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a model of a decision maker using an expert to obtain
information. The expert is biased toward some favoured decision but cares also about
its reputation on the market for experts. We then analyse the corresponding decision
game depending on the nature of the informational linkage with the market. In the
case where the expert is biased in favour of the status quo, the nal decision is always
biased in the same direction. Moreover, it is better to rely on experts biased against
the status quo. We also show that it is optimal to publically disclose the expert report.
Finally, we prove that the intuitive results that hiring an honest inside expert raises
the outside experts incentives to report truthfully holds when reports are public but
not when they are secret.
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Expertise and Bias in Decision Making
1 Introduction
In many economic environments, information plays a critical role in decision making. How-
ever, this information is not always available to the decision maker while it is known, or
can be gathered, by a group of parties who are interested in the decision. For instance, the
qualication of a merger as anti competitive crucially depends on the expected e¢ ciency
gains attained by the merger. To make an e¢ cient decision, the Competition Authority
can elicit this information from experts. This could be a di¢ cult task because experts are
often biased in favor of a concerned party. To mitigate this informational problem, the
European Competition Authority has recently decided to create her own team of economic
experts1. This is also the case of the agencies in charge of the evaluation of medical prod-
ucts. The role of those agencies is to monitor and control the quality of health products.
The decisions are motivated through the advice of internal and external experts. However,
external experts may have common interests with industries concerned by the decision.
This creates eventual conicts of interests which must be taken into account by the agency.
Other examples of delegated expertise when some experts are biased are, among others,
stock recommendations by nancial analysts2 or the evaluation of a project by scientic
experts.
This paper studies how those conicts of interests a¤ects the e¢ ciency of information
transmission between the experts and the decision maker when the formers also care about
their reputation on the market for experts. We analyze the corresponding decision game
depending on the nature of the informational linkage with the market. Our results are
twofold. First, relying on experts biased against the status quo enhances the e¢ ciency of
the decision. Second, there always exists an equilibrium of the game with secret reports
which leads to a lower e¢ ciency in terms of information transmission than provided by all
equilibria of the game with public disclosure of the experts report. The decision maker can
therefore use these tools to mitigate the e¤ects of conicts of interests.
To consider this situation, we develop a framework where a Decision Authority (DA)
wants to maximize the social surplus. To make an e¢ cient decision, the DA hires at
some xed wage an outside expert, who cares about its reputation, the social surplus, but
also special interests due to collusion or bribery. For instance, he may also have common
interests with a concerned party, the competitors or the consumers. Experts may gather a
private signal about the social surplus. We model information gathering by a private signal
1See Roller, Stennek and Verboven (2000) and Kuhn (2002) for more details about Europeam Competition
Authority decision.
2Bruce (2002) analyzes what causes analysts to have such a signicant bias in their recommendations.
See also Morgan and Stocken (2003) for a theoretical study of this point.
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which is hard information. This means that the expert cannot manipulate their signal.
However, he may conceal the information he has gathered. Within this framework, the DA
will always follow an experts advice when it is informative even though there are conicts
of interests. When the experts report is uninformative, she will base her decision on the
revised expectation of the value of the surplus. The incentive of the expert to reveal his
information comes for the benets he derives from signalling to the market his ability to
generate an informative signal.
In addition, we allow the DA to hire an inside expert. Inside experts interests are
perfectly aligned with the DA. However, due to time constraints or lack of expertise about
this particular decision, the information they gather is less precise than the outside experts
one.
We rst analyze the e¢ ciency of information transmission when the market perfectly
observes the experts reports. When the DA cannot hire inside experts, we show that if
the outside expertsbias is not too high, they will always report the truth. But they may
have incentives to misreport when their bias is higher. Indeed, when misreporting moves
the decision in the same direction than the experts bias and when the gain from this is
higher than the loss from reputation, the expert will conceal his information and report that
he is uninformed. Moreover, the reputation gain when announcing an informative report
decreases with the set of signals for which he decides to misreport. The fact that the expert
misreports for some values of the signal reduces the opportunity cost of not reporting as
it becomes relatively less likely that a non-reporting expert didnt receive any information.
Thus misreport is to some extent self-enforcing: the more the market anticipates some
misreport, the higher the incentives to misreport. This creates the possibility of multiple
equilibria. We show that when the expert reports the truth more often, the DAs welfare
raises and the experts welfare diminishes. However, due to the multiplicity of equilibria,
the e¤ects of the experts bias on the welfare depend on the equilibrium selection.
In the presence of inside experts, the outside expert reports the truth more often. This
is due to the fact that the probability that an uninformed report moves the decision is
reduced which makes misreporting less protable. Moreover, hiring an inside expert raises
the DAs welfare. However, when the outside expertsbias is not too high or when their
expertise is superior enough, the value of hiring an inside expert decreases. In such cases,
the authority may not want to bear the costs of hiring an inside expert.
We then consider the model when the expert identity is secret. Now, there are no
experts who always report the truth. This means that compared to the case of public
identity, for the same value of the bias, an expert lies more when his identity cannot be
known by the market. This result is not surprising because under this assumption there is
no e¤ect of reputation.
Finally, we analyze information transmission when the experts reports are secret.
Within this framework, the renement of the markets expectations about the experts
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expertise can now only be based on the nal decision and not on the reports. Misreporting
is therefore less costly for the expert in terms of reputation. The structure of equilibria
with secret reports is similar to the case of public reports. We then compare information
transmission with secret and public reports. Due to the multiplicity of equilibria, we are
only able to show that for any equilibrium of the game with public report, there exists
an equilibrium of the game with secret report where the expert misreports more often. In
particular when considering only equilibria in which the expert lie the most, or only the
ones with maximal truth telling3, an expert misreports more often when reports are secret.
Moreover, we prove that when expertsreports are secret, hiring an inside expert reduces
the outside experts incentives to report truthfully in all pure strategy equilibria. The result
is therefore reversed compared to the case of public report. Caeteris paribus, hiring an inside
expert is less attractive if the reports are secret compared to the case where they are public.
This paper belongs to the literature on decision making with biased experts in favor
of one cause. The nearest antecedent to our paper is Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) who
analyze the advantages of competing advocacies in an incomplete contract framework. They
show that, in selecting two competing agents each collecting one signal rather than one
gathering two signals, the principal may improve the quality of decision-making. Our
paper deviates from theirs in two respects. First, our main objective is not to discuss the
role of advocacy in decision making even though we show that it is better to rely on experts
biased against the status quo, but to emphasize the role of reputation concerns. Second, we
analyze the e¢ ciency of information transmission between the experts and the DA under
di¤erent informational features while Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) concentrate on the
case of public reports.
Several authors have analyzed the incentives of biased experts to misreport in cheap
talk models. This literature has been initiated by Crawford and Sobel (1982). They show
that full reporting of information is impossible when an expert is biased. Li (2003) extends
this result and show that consulting two experts is better than consulting just one. The
main di¤erence with our paper is that information is hard in our model even though it
can be concealed while it is non veriable in cheap talk games. Moreover, we show that
their result establishing that hiring two experts is more e¢ cient than hiring only one is true
exclusively in case reports are public. Specically, this result cannot be generalized to the
case of secret reports.
Morris (2001) introduces reputation concerns. In a repeated framework, he shows that
reputation may induce the expert to misreport. However, in Morris (2001), reputation
concerns are about the bias of the expert while in our model it is about the quality of
expertise. This reverses the e¤ects of reputation. Indeed, in our model reputation induces
3Selection of those equilibria is usual in the information transmission literature. See Shin (1998), Li
(2003), or Frisell (2004) among others. For methods of renements of cheap talk equilibria, one may refer
to Farrell (1993).
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the expert to report the truth more often.
We also share Ottaviani and Sorensens (2001) result that reputation concerns does not
give in general the right incentives to truthfully report information. However, we mitigate
this result when the experts identity is publicly known. We show that no matter if reports
are public or secret, there are low values of the bias for which an expert always report
truthfully.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and solves it
when the experts reports are public. In Section 3, we present the model and results when
the expertidentity is secret. Section 4 analyzes information transmission when the experts
reports are secret. Then, section 5 concludes. Finally, proofs are in section 6.
2 The base model
The decision authority is denoted DA and her objective is to maximize the social surplus.
We assume that the social surplus is a parameter  (say function of the e¢ ciency gains
caused by the merger). Thus, without loss of generality, we can state that the DAs objective
is y where y is the decision that can take two values: y = 0 or y = 1 (corresponding for
instance to blocking or accepting a merger). The DA is risk neutral. Lets assume that 




; with a cumulative F , a non-decreasing
density function f(:)4 and  > 0 > .
To make an e¢ cient decision, the DA hires at some xed wage an outside expert, who
cares about its reputation, the social surplus, but also special interests due to collusion or
bribery. For instance, he may also be hired by a concerned party, the competitors, the
consumers, or have common interests with one of them. This outside expert can gather
information about . We normalize the model by assuming that the experts are biased in
favor of the decision y = 1 and receive a benet   0 when this decision is reached5.
Prior to the consultation, experts have a particular expertise,  2 f; g that is unknown
to all the parties. An expert with expertise  (resp. ); gathers an informative signal with
probability p (resp. p): Lets denote the prior probability that an expert has expertise 
by (p), and the prior probability that the expert be informed by p^ = pp + (1   p)p: We
assume that the signal is s =  when observed by the expert. The expert information is
thus s 2 f;g  ;  where ; corresponds to no signal.
We model the expertswillingness to maintain their reputation by their future wages
which depend on the renement of the markets expectations about their expertise. In par-
ticular the expert obtains an expected premium w when being perceived of high expertise.
We denote by i the markets information.
4To prove our results, we only need to assume that f () is non-decreasing on the range  < 0:
5The same results emerge when experts are biased against the decision y = 1:
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Thus, the objective of an outside expert with bias  is to maximize the following utility
function:
U = y + wPr( = ji) + yE(js)
where the rst term corresponds to the experts bias, the second to his willingness to
maintain his reputation, the third to the weight he puts on the social surplus.
Lets consider the following framework for the manipulation of information. An expert
cannot report that he has gathered an informative signal if it is not the case, nor report
another informative signal than the one he has gathered. In other words the informative
signal is hard information and can be transmitted to the authority. However, an expert
can hide that he has gathered an informative signal and report an uninformative one6.
An interpretation for hard information is that the DA requires a formal proof in order to
validate the experts report. Any report which does not satisfy this condition is refused.
The game is then the following: the expert observe s 2 f;g  ; , he reports r 2
f;g  fsg and then the DA chooses y:
2.1 Equilibrium analysis
A strategy for an expert when he has received signal s is a function mapping the experts
private information about  into a report. It is characterized by the set  of signals for
which an informed expert decides to report no information. For other signals s is truthfully
reported.
The strategy of the authority is a mapping from reports into probabilities of making
decision y = 1. Lets note that as information is hard, when the expert reports an infor-
mative signal about , the DA follows the advice and make the corresponding decision. If
the expert reports the signal  < 0; (resp.  > 0), the DA chooses y = 0 (resp. y = 1).
However, when the expert reports an uninformative signal ;; there are three cases for the
DA. Let EDA(); the authoritys expectations about  when receiving an uninformative
report:
EDA() = E f j s 2 f;g g :
First, when EDA() > 0; the DA chooses y = 1 as she expects that this decision may have
a positive impact on the social surplus. Second, when EDA() < 0; she makes decision
y = 0. Finally, when EDA() = 0; she is indi¤erent between 0 and 1 and she may therefore
use a mixed strategy: y = 1 with probability q.
Consider now the expert. Lets rst note that when he receives good news (  0);
the expert will always report it to the DA. Indeed, as making an uninformative report will
reduce the reputation term and will not bring any gains in this case, the expert has no
incentives to misreport.
6This framework is also used in La¤ont and Tirole (1991) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).
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Moreover, when receiving an uninformative signal, the only thing that an expert can do
is reporting it. Thus, we only have to consider the reporting strategy of an expert receiving
a signal   0:
When EDA() < 0; the expert having signal   0 will report truthfully his signal.
Indeed, the DAs decision is not a¤ected by a negative report as without any signals she
should make decision y = 0. Moreover, a report increases the perceived likelihood that the
expert has a good expertise when
Pr( = js = )  Pr( = j;):
This is always satised as the probability that the expert has a good expertise is greater
when he reports an informative signal than an uninformative one. Then, when EDA() < 0;
the expert will always report truthfully his signal.
It means that asking for an advice from an expert biased against the status quo makes
information transmission truthful. If without consulting any expert, the authority would
make a decision, an expert in favor of the opposite decision reports truthfully because this
rises the perceived likelihood that he has a good expertise.
Result 1 : Relying on experts biased against the status quo enhances the e¢ ciency of the
decision.
We immediately obtain that if E ()  0; there is a unique equilibrium in which the
expert reports the signal for all values of . First, this strategy is an equilibrium since
EDA (;) = E ()  0: Second, as EDA () < E () if  is not empty, there is no other
equilibrium. in fact, as a positively biased expert only has incentives to lie when the signal
he receives is negative, the DAs rened prior expectation about the e¢ ciency gains when
the expert reports an uninformative signal is always negative. Furthermore, when receiving
a negative signal, the expert has no incentives to lie because in any case the DAs decision
will be the same. Lying does not bring any gain but involve a loss in reputation. The
experts optimal strategy is therefore to always report truthfully.
Hence, from now on we focus on the other case:
Assumption E () > 0:
Notice that it is not possible that EDA () < 0 in this case, because this would imply
that  is empty. Thus we have
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium EDA ()  0 and q > 0:
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Proof. Suppose q = 0; then reporting ; induces y = 0; so that the expert reports 
when informed and  is empty, a contradiction with assumption E() > 0. So q > 0 which
implies that EDA  0
Lets remind that q is the probability that an authority who is indi¤erent between
decisions y = 0 and y = 1; chooses decision y = 1:
When q > 0; the expert having signal  < 0 will report truthfully his signal when
wPr( = j)  q + wPr( = j;) + q
, q ( + )  wp()
where we denote p() the gain of reputation when announcing an informative report
when the market anticipates that signal s 2  induces report ;: More formally, we have:
p() = Pr( = js 2 ;  n)  Pr( = js 2 f;g ):
This denes a lower bound for the values of e¢ ciency gains for which an expert lies.
Notice that this lower bound must be negative. It means that when it is not, experts report
truthfully, i.e.  is empty.
We are now able to characterize ; the set of signals for which an informed expert
prefers to misreport.
Proposition 2 Either  is empty or there exists  < 0 such that  = [; 0]:
The ways in which the DA acquires information from the expertsreports are twofold.
First, when reporting allows the expert to reach his favorite decision or when misreporting
may cause the DA to make a too wrong decision, the expert truthfully reports the infor-
mation. This enables the DA to make the right decision. Second, when reporting helps the
DA to make the experts unfavored decision, the expert withhold the information. Even
though the authority cannot know when the expert misreports or has not gathered any
information, she gives more importance to the states of the nature belonging to  when
making her decision. Decision making is therefore more e¢ cient than without any experts.
The rst case is only possible if the reputation e¤ect is strong enough. Indeed it is
immediate that there is an equilibrium with full reporting ( = ; and q = 1) if and only if
  wp(;):
Indeed, this strategy is an equilibrium (given E() > 0) if and only if the expert
announces  even when it is very small.
When the private benets received by an expert if his favorite decision is reached are low,
there is an equilibrium in which he always report truthfully (corresponding to  empty).
Intuitively, as in such cases the gains from moving a decision are low, it is in the experts
interest to maintain his reputation by reporting truthfully. Thus an equilibrium with full
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reporting only arises when the reputation e¤ects dominate the private benets from decision
y = 1 being reached.
Lets now focus on the case with misreport and compute the interval  that induces
report ; and the probability q of having a positive decision with no report.
The strategy of the expert is to report no signal if
wp([; 0[)
q
     < 0:










First notice that wp([; 0]) increases with : The fact that the expert misreports
for some values of the signal reduces the opportunity cost of not reporting as it becomes
relatively less likely that a non-reporting expert didnt receive any information. Thus mis-
report is to some extent self-reinforcing: the more the market anticipates some misreport,
the higher the incentives to misreport. This creates the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Equilibrium conditions are then
1. Either
EDA([













; 0[) = 0;




In order to give a complete characterization of the equilibria, we use the function (:);
dened as:
() = wp([; 0])  :
Notice that wp(;) = (0) = lim!0 (): Then we must have  = () for an
interior pure strategy equilibrium.
Lets also remark that the authoritys expectations about  when receiving an un-
informative report decreases when she anticipates that the expert will lie more often
(when  decreases). Together with the previous equilibrium conditions, it means that
if EDA([; 0]) > 0, a mixed strategy equilibrium cannot exist.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that EDA([; 0]) > 0; then an equilibrium with misreport is char-
acterized by q = 1 and solution  < 0 of (1).
Thus full misreport of negative values,  =  is an equilibrium if and only if
() = wp([; 0])    :
It means that if the authority is optimistic about the e¢ ciency gains, an equilibrium
in which an expert always lies when he observes an unfavorable signal may exist. Experts
take advantage of the authoritys optimism in hiding their information when it leads her to
choose their favorite decision.
We are now able to state the following existence result.
Corollary 4 When EDA([; 0])  0; there exists an equilibrium.
Proof. We have  empty when   (0);  = [; 0] when   () as equilibria.
Suppose that (0) <  < (): Then ()    changes sign from positive to negative
between  =  and  = 0: Thus there exists a solution  to (1) : When EDA([; 0]) = 0; all
that we say is valid except that there may also exists equilibria with q < 1:
Notice that several equilibria may emerge as one does not know the variations of the
function (:) so that the equation  = () may have several solutions.
Let us now turn to the case where EDA([; 0]) < 0: Then it is not possible to have
no reports for all ; as no report would induce a decision y = 0 and entail an opportunity
cost in terms of reputation. In fact, the authority is now less condent about the e¢ ciency
gains. When the e¢ ciency gains are low, i.e.  close to ; in misreporting an expert cannot
obtain his preferred decision. As we have seen above, it is therefore optimal for him to
report truthfully. This also gives rise to mixed strategy equilibria as the authority may be
indi¤erent between both decisions.
Dene 0 as the solution of
EDA([0; 0]) = 0:
The following proposition follows from the previous equilibrium conditions.
Proposition 5 Suppose that EDA([; 0])  0; then  = [; 0] and q = 1 is an equilibrium
if and only if  2 [0; 0] and is solution of
() = ; (2)
there is an equilibrium at  = 0 and q < 1 if and only if
(0) < :
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Proof. Any equilibrium must verify   0 >  as  < 0 implies that q = 0: Thus a
solution with q = 1 must solve (2) :
There is an equilibrium at q < 1 if and only if 0 < q = wp([
;0[)
+ < 1 or
 0 < 
wp([0; 0])  0 < 
The equilibria that we obtain have the same form than with EDA([; 0]) > 0: The only
di¤erence is the emergence of mixed strategy equilibria due to the fact that the authority is
now less condent about the e¢ ciency gains and may be indi¤erent between both decisions.
Again, equilibria exist for the same reasons than previously.
Corollary 6 Suppose that EDA([; 0])  0; then an equilibrium exists.
Proof. The proof is the same as Corollary 5, replacing  by 0:
To summarize we have:
Result 2 :
i) when   (0) there is an equilibrium with full transmission of the information;
ii) when (0) <   (0); there is an equilibrium with  < 0 and q = 1;
iii) when  > (max (; 0)), there exists an equilibrium with either ( = ; q = 1) or
( = 0 and q < 1) depending on whether EDA([; 0]) is positive or negative.
Obviously these possibilities are not exclusive, and several equilibria may exist. Given
that wp([; 0]) increases with ; the comparison between (0) or  () and (0) is am-
biguous. It also appears that the structure of equilibria is governed by the shape of the
function ():
To provide a more complete structure of equilibria, we show in appendix that the func-
tion (:) is convex and that
wp ([; 0]) =
(0)





The term (0) is the value of the reputation gain when the fact that the expert receives
the information or not is public. The term l is the likelihood ratio of the information.
Thanks to those properties of the function , we are able to determine when the equi-
librium is unique and when there is a multiplicity of equilibria.
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Proposition 7
 If   (0)lf(0) = 1; there exists a unique equilibrium for all .
 Assume that  < 1: Then, the equilibrium is unique for  > (0) ( < 0) or if
 < min () ( = ;): Otherwise there are three equilibria.
Proof. The rst part follows from 0(0)  0: Indeed, as   (0)lf(0) = 1; we have
0(0)  0: Together with the convexity of ; this gives that  is decreasing. Using the
characterization of equilibria, we can conclude that (0) < (max (; 0)): This implies
that the three previous possibilities are exclusive, resulting in a unique equilibrium.
For the second part, lets note that  < min () means that an expert always report
truthfully. Moreover, if  > (0); as  is decreasing on the range  < 0 and () > (0);
there also exists a unique equilibrium.
We consider now the case of min ()    (0): As   (0); a full reporting
equilibrium always exists. We have now two di¤erent cases. In the rst one, (0) < (b);
it follows from convexity that the equation () =  has two solutions, giving rise to
two equilibria. Moreover, as  < (b); there is no other equilibria. In the second one,
(0) > (b); convexity implies that the equation () =  has two solutions formin () 
 < (b) and a unique solution for (b)    (0): Moreover, for (b)    (0); there
also exists an equilibrium with either ( = ; q = 1) or ( = 0 and q < 1) depending on
whether EDA([; 0]) is positive or negative.
We can therefore conclude that there are three equilibria when min ()    (0):
Let us now describe those equilibria in more details. To simplify the notations, we
denote b = max (; 0) : Basically, we have four cases depending on :








j  2 () (0)  (b)o
3 =
n
j  3 () 0(b)  0o
Lets remark that we have 3  2  1.
1. When  is large,   1; we have 0(0)  0 and there exists a unique equilibrium for
all . Lets remark that in this case,  is decreasing on the range [max (; 0) ; 0] and
(b)  (0): This is represented in Figure 1. In this case, if  > (0) the expert
decides to lie when his signal belongs to the set
h
max
b;  ; 0h and if   (0) the
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Fig. 1: Equilibria with 0(0 )  0 :
2. When 2   < 1, 0(0) is now positive but we still have (0)  (b): This is rep-
resented in Figure 2. In this case, there exists a unique equilibrium, if  > (0) in
which the expert decides to lie when his signal belongs to the set
h
max
b;  ; 0h ;
and if  < min () in which the expert always report truthfully. However, if
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Fig. 2: Equilibria with 0(0 )  0 ; 0(b)  0and (b)  (0 ):
3. When 3   < 2, 0(0) is now positive, we still have 0(b)  0; but now we have
(0)  (b): This is represented in Figure 3. Again, there exists a unique equilibrium,
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if  > (0) in which the expert decides to lie when his signal belongs to the seth
max
b;  ; 0h ; and if  < min () in which the expert always report truthfully.
We also have, as previously, if  2 [min (); (0)] ; there coexists three equilibria.
However, lets note that, now, when  2
h
(b); (0)i ; there exists an equilibrium
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Fig. 3: Equilibria with 0(0 )  0 ; 0(b)  0and (b)  (0 ):
4. When  > 3, 
0(b) is now positive which means that  is increasing on the range
[max (; 0) ; 0] : This is represented in Figure 4. Again, there exists a unique equi-




b;  ; 0h ; and if  < min () in which the expert always report
truthfully. We also have, as previously, if  2 [min (); (0)] ; there coexists three
equilibria. But now, the range of bias, ; for which there is an equilibrium where
the expert lies as much as possible is raised because such an equilibrium exists for all
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Fig. 4: Equilibria with 0(b)  0 :
2.2 Welfare analysis
In order to analyze the e¤ects of the conicts of interests on the di¤erent parties, we
now examine how their welfare varies with the bias of the hired expert. However, due to
the multiplicity of equilibria in some cases, we need to make an equilibrium selection to
complete the welfare analysis. First, lets note that some of our equilibria are not stable
to a little change in the beliefs. This is the case, when there are two interior equilibria, of
the highest one. However, the multiplicity of equilibria survives even though we eliminate
those unstable equilibria.
To cope with this multiplicity, lets apply the methodology used by Shin (1998), Li
(2003), or Frisell (2004) among others. They only consider the equilibrium in which the
expert always lie as much as possible and the one in which he reports the truth as often as
possible. Those equilibria are the most studied in the information transmission literature
in order to simplify the comparisons between equilibria.
Both equilibria have a nice and intuitive property. They are monotone in the bias. It
means that when we only consider one of those equilibria, the more an expert is biased, the
larger is the range in which he lies. Using our notations, along those equilibria the function
(:) is decreasing if  is interior.
To simplify matters we will focus on the case  > 0, so that q = 1 in all equilibria.
Lets rst consider the DAs welfare. Let p^ = (1  p) p+ pp:We have




f () d + (1  p^)E () :
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We can now study how the DAs welfare varies with : This will allow us to state what
happens when the range on which the expert lies rises.
@WDA
@
=  p^f () > 0:
Not surprisingly, when the expert reports the truth more often, the DAs welfare raises.
As we only consider equilibria in which the range in which the expert lies increases with
the bias, this implies that the DAs welfare is non increasing in the bias of the expert.
Lets consider now the experts welfare. Notice that in expected terms the experts
reputation gain is constant, equal to pw: Thus we have
WE(; 
) = pw + p^ [1  F ()] f + E ( j   )g+ (1  p^) f + E ()g
= pw + p^ [1  F ()] + p^
Z

f () d + (1  p^) f + E ()g :
Again, we study the variations of the experts welfare: First,
@WE
@
=  p^f () ( + ) < 0
Between two equilibria the expert always prefers the equilibrium with the smallest
: This is because in equilibrium a decision y = 1 is only adopted when it benets the
expert. This implies that for any equilibrium selection where  is non-decreasing with ;
the welfare WE increases with :
Total Welfare
Now consider the following situation: the expert is the only available and has a cost C
to provide the expertise. The experts knows that if he refuses to participate the decision
will be y = 1: He then requires a wage C +wp+  + E() WE(; ): The total welfare
gain for the pair DA-expert created by the expertise gross of the cost C is
WT = WDA +WE   (wp+  + E())  C
= p^
0@  (1 + ) Z
0
f () d   F ()
1A  C
For a xed , notice that
@WT
@
=  p^f () ( + (1 + ) ) ;
@WT
@
=  p^F () < 0:
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The higher the bias the more reluctant will be the expert to participate, as his partici-
pation raises the chance of a decision y = 0: Thus for a xed  it would be better to have
an unbiased expert.






















 () + (1 + ) 







(1 + lF (0))(0)
(1 + l (F (0)  F ()))2

:
We see that it may not be the case that a benevolent principal prefers a less biased expert
when the equilibrium is interior. Indeed, in some cases the total welfare gains increase with
the bias of the expert. This may arise when the expert is not too a¤ected by a loss in social
surplus, i.e.  low. An increase in the bias raises the experts benets from misreporting
because this expert only has low social surplus concerns. When those benets compensate
the reduction of the total welfare due to a stronger bias, the benevolent principal may prefer
a more biased expert.
2.3 Consultation of Inside experts
We then study if the presence of inside experts will enhance the social surplus. Inside
experts interests are perfectly aligned with the DA. Their objective is to maximize the
social surplus. However, due to time constraints or lack of expertise about this particular
decision, the information they gather is less precise than the outside expertsone. Let pI
be the probability that an inside expert will gather an informative signal.
Lets remark that an inside expert has no incentives to lie and thus always report
truthfully. However, due to his lack of expertise, he gathers less often informative signals.
Lets now analyze precisely what happens when an inside expert may be hired.
When the outside expert receives ; he is forced to report : When the outside expert
observes ; there are 2 cases: either the outside expert reports  and the CA does not
involve the inside expert, or the outside expert reports  and the CA does involves the
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inside expert. In the latter case, when the inside expert reports ; nothing is changed
compared to the case without inside experts. However, the inside expert may report  in
which case the decision is reversed and the DA chooses y = 0: The outside expert reporting
strategy may therefore change.
Thus, when q > 0; the outside expert having signal  < 0 will report truthfully his
signal when
wPr( = j)  Pr [I reports ] (q + wPr( = j) + q)
+Pr [I reports ] (wPr( = j))
, q ( + )  wp(I)
1  pI ;
where I is the set of signals for which the informed outside expert decides to report
no information when an inside expert may be hired.
This denes a new value for I ; higher than 
, as (1  pI) < 1:
Proposition 8 When expertsreports are public, hiring an inside expert raises the outside
experts incentives to report truthfully.
Lets note that hiring an inside expert has two e¤ects on the reporting strategy. The
direct e¤ect comes from the fact that if the outside expert lies, the inside experts report
may contradict him. The indirect e¤ect is due to the set of signals for which the informed
outside expert decides to report no information which is now smaller.
We can now compute the value of hiring an inside expert for the authority which we
dene as the di¤erence between the DAs welfare when she hires an inside expert and when






where V 1I = WDA(

I ; I) WDA(; I)
V 2I = WDA(
; I) WDA()
The rst term V 1I captures the indirect e¤ect discussed above. The second one V
2
I represents
the value of the additional information brought by the inside expert for xed incentives. As
the DAs welfare is increasing in ; and as   I ; V 1I is positive. Lets state V 2I
V 2I = p^Pr () [ pIE ( j  2 )]
+ (1  p^) Pr (  0) [ pIE ( j   0)]
As E ( j  2 ) and E ( j   0) are non negative, V 2I is also non negative.
The main conclusion is rst that VI  0; and second that V 1I > 0: Both e¤ects enhance
the social surplus. If hiring an inside expert is not too costly for the DA, this is therefore
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protable to do it. Moreover, lets note that, even though relying on an inside expert would
not modify the incentives of outside experts to report truthfully, this would have a positive
e¤ect on the social welfare because of the additional information they provide.
3 The model when the experts identity is secret
This is also interesting to consider the model when the expert identity is secret. Under
this assumption, there is no e¤ect of reputation. The expert utility is thus U = y +wp+
yE(js):
3.1 Equilibrium analysis
When he receives good news (  0); the expert always reports it to the DA. Indeed, as
making an uninformative report reduces the reputation term and do not bring any gains in
this case, the expert has no incentive to misreport.
Moreover, when receiving an uninformative signal, the only thing that an expert can
do is reporting it. Thus, we only have to consider the reporting strategy when an expert
receives a signal   0:
When EDA() < 0; the expert having signal   0 report truthfully his signal because
he is indi¤erent between lying and reporting truthfully.




Lets denote as before b = max f; 0g, and 0() =  :
We have that:
i) there is no equilibrium with full transmission of the information;
ii) when   0(b); there is an equilibrium with si =   and q = 1;
iii) when  > 0(b), there exists an equilibrium with either (si = ; q = 1) or (si = 0 and q = 0)
depending on whether EDA([; 0]) is positive or negative.
Moreover, we are able to state the following uniqueness result:
Proposition 9 As  is decreasing on [b; 0]; the equilibrium is unique, and si  :
The structure of the equilibrium is represented in Figure 5. It is the same kind of
equilibrium as when  is high enough and the experts identity is public. Except that now,
there is no expert who always report the truth. This means that compared to the case of
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public identity, for the same value of the bias, an expert lies more when his identity cannot
be known by the market. This is quite intuitive because in the latter case, the expert does
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Fig. 5: Equilibrium when identity is secret :
4 The model when the experts report is secret
The model is the same than before except that now, the experts identity is public and his
reports are secret. This means that the renement of the markets expectations about the
experts expertise can only be based on the nal decision and not on the reports.
Lets note that within this framework, the market has not the same abilities to determine
the experts expertise. Lying is therefore less costly for the expert in terms of reputation.
Thus, we expect that the expert will lie more often when reports are secret.
4.1 Equilibrium analysis
Again, a strategy for an expert when he has received signal s is a function mapping the
experts private information about  into a report. It is characterized by the set sr of
signals for which the informed expert decides to report no information. For other signals, s
is truthfully reported. For the same reasons than previously, we focus on the case E () > 0:
The strategy of the authority is a mapping from reports into probabilities q. If the expert
reports the signal  < 0; (resp.  > 0), the DA chooses y = 0 (resp. y = 1). However, when
the expert reports an uninformative signal ;; there are three cases for the DA, depending
on the authoritys expectations EDA(sr) about  when receiving an uninformative report
:First, when EDA(sr) > 0; she chooses y = 1. Second, when EDA(sr) < 0; she chooses
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y = 0. Finally, when EDA(sr) = 0; she is indi¤erent between 0 and 1 and she may
therefore use a mixed strategy: y = 1 with probability q.
Lets now consider the experts strategy. First, when receiving an uninformative signal,
the only thing that an expert can do is reporting it. Thus, we only have to consider the
reporting strategy when an expert receives an informative signal. As for the DA, there are
three cases, depending on EDA(sr): Lets denote s(sr; q) the gain of reputation when
the DAs decision is y = 0 when the market anticipates that signal s 2 sr induces report
; and when the probability of y = 1 if the experts reports an uninformative signal ; is q:
s(sr; q) = Pr( = jy = 0)  Pr( = jy = 1):
Then an expert with information  > 0 would report the true value if
q [ + wPr( = jy = 1) + ] + (1  q)wPr( = jy = 0)
>  + wPr( = jy = 1) + 
which reduces to
(1  q) ( +    ws(sr; q)) > 0 (3)
The expert having signal   0 will report  when
q [ + wPr( = jy = 1) + ] + (1  q)wPr( = jy = 0)
< wPr( = jy = 0)
or when
q ( +    ws(sr; q)) < 0 (4)
Following the previous analysis of public reports, we dene on [; 0] the function
 (sr) = ws([

sr; 0] ; 1)  sr:
As before, the function  is convex if E() > 0; when the density f increases for negative
values of :
Equilibria with q = 0:
When EDA(sr) < 0; the probability that the DA chooses y = 1 when the experts
reports an uninformative signal is q = 0: Notice that s(sr; 0)  0 because a favorable
decision from the DA is good news for the experts reputation (it can only occur if the
expert is informed). Thus, there is a loss of reputation when the DAs decision is y = 0.
When he receives good news (  0); the expert will also always report it to the DA as
 +    s(sr; 0) > 0: Now, the expert having signal   0 may or may not report
truthfully his signal since her utility in lying is the same than in reporting truthfully.
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Such an equilibrium would always exist if E() were negative, in which case the expert
would always report truthfully his signal and the DA would choose y = 0 if there is no
report. But we have assumed that under the veil of ignorance, the DA would choose y = 1:
Still there exists equilibria with q = 0 if EDA([; 0])  0: In particular there are equilibria
where experts hide the information when  lies in sr for any set such EDA(sr)  0:; This
holds in particular for sets sr = [sr; 0] where 

sr  0:
To select among these equilibria we suppose that there is an " probability that the
report be observed by the outside parties. We say that an equilibrium is robust to a small
perturbation in the information structureif the game with " > 0 small has an equilibrium
that is close to the initial one (in terms of q and sr):
In the perturbed game the expert would report a negative  when q = 0: Thus the
above equilibrium disappears. But some close equilibrium may remain. The expert reports
 < 0 when
q [ + ]  (1  ")qws(sr; q)  "wp(sr)  0
Indeed with probability "; the report is observed so that the market update its beliefs as the
in the previous section and the reputation gain for an informative report is wp(sr): Thus
there is a threshold sr such that sr = [

sr; 0] : For 1 > q > 0; we must have 

sr = 0: Now
we can nd an equilibrium with q < 1 if
 "wp([0; 0]) < 0 < [ + 0]  (1  ")ws([0; 0] ; 1)  "wp([0; 0]):
We then obtain
Lemma 10 There exists an equilibrium with q = 0 robust to a small perturbation in the
information structure if  >  (0): This equilibrium is characterized by sr = [0; 0] :
Proof. From above we must have sr = [0; 0] : Moreover for " > 0, we have
[ + 0]  (1  ")ws([0; 0] ; 1)  "wp([0; 0])
> [ + 0]  ws([0; 0] ; 1) =  (0)  0:
so the probability q is dened as
q" =
"wp([0; 0])
[ + 0]  (1  ")ws([0; q"] ; 1)
and converges to zero as " goes to zero.
Equilibria with q > 0:
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When EDA(sr) > 0; the probability that the DA chooses y = 1 when the experts
reports an uninformative signal is q = 1 and we have s(sr; 1) > 0: The expert having
signal   0 will report truthfully his signal since her utility in lying is the same than in
reporting truthfully.7 When he receives bad news (  0); the expert will lie when
 +   ws(sr; 1)
Finally, when EDA(sr) = 0; the probability that the DA chooses y = 1 when the
experts reports an uninformative signal is q 2 (0; 1):The expert having signal   0 will lie
when
  ws(sr; q)  

The expert having signal   0 will lie when
  ws(sr; q)  

:
Lets remark that an expert cannot lie in both situations as ws(sr;q)  is given for an
expert. When ws(sr; q)     0; the expert will report truthfully for all   0. This
implies that EDA(sr) > 0: However, this is in contradiction with EDA(sr) = 0: Thus, we
have ws(sr; q)    0: The expert will therefore report truthfully for all   0 and will
lie when ws(sr;q)     0:
The equilibrium strategies are in the same lines than in the case of public reports. They
are stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 11
 Either sr is empty or there exists sr < 0 such that sr = [sr; 0]:
 There is an equilibrium with full reporting (sr = ; and q = 1) if and only if    (0):
Proof. The proof is the same as in the case with public reports.
Again, full reporting (sr empty) is only possible if the reputation e¤ect is strong
enough.
Lets now focus on situations with misreport and compute the interval sr that induces
report ; and the probability q of having a positive decision with no report. Remind that 0 is
dened as the solution of EDA([0; 0]) = 0: From above, the equilibrium have 0  sr  0;
1  q; and q = 1 if sr > 0:








; q = 1;
7Formally if " = 0; there is always a trivial equilibria where the expert reports ; for a large set of negative
values  and q = 1; but it would not be robust to a small perturbation in the information structure.
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Otherwise the equilibrium veries:
sr = 0;
0 < q < 1:
and
 + 0 = ws(sr; q)
Notice that the analysis is similar to the case of public reports for pure strategy equilibria
except for the value of reputation gains: the gain from reporting sr when q = 1 is now
 (sr)   . It follows that the analysis of pure strategy equilibria is the same as before,
replacing the function (sr) by the function  (

sr):
In particular all the previous analysis carries over with the new  function if EDA([; 0]) >
0:
Proposition 12 Suppose that EDA([; 0]) > 0; then any equilibrium is characterized by
q = 1. Moreover there exists an equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is the same as with public reports.
Thus
- no reporting of negative values (sr = ) is an equilibrium if  ()  ;
- full reporting is an equilibrium if  (0)  :
- There exists one equilibrium with partial reporting of negative values ifmax ( ();  (0)) >
 > min ( ();  (0)) :
- There exists two equilibria with partial reporting of negative values ifmin ( ();  (0)) >
 > min(;0)  ():
In the case where EDA([; 0]) < 0; the analysis extends only for equilibria with q = 1:
But the analysis of mixed strategy di¤ers from the case where the report is public. With
private reports q(ws(sr; q)      ) is the net gain of reporting a negative value. For
q > 0; the sign is the same as the sign of ws(sr; q)     :
We show in appendix that s(sr; q) is increasing in sr and q: The reputation gain
obtained by reporting  < 0 is now increasing with the probability q that the DA chooses
y = 1 with no report. It is negative for q = 0 and positive for q = 1: This contrasts with
the case of a public report.
The key di¤erence with before is the following. When the report is observed, the
reputation gain is independent of q. The probability q then a¤ects the benets of no
report in terms of induced decision. Thus increasing q reduces the incentive to report.
When the report is secret however there is no direct e¤ect of q on the incentive to report
a negative value (for q > 0) as the reputation gain is only obtained if the decision is
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y = 0: But the reputation gain depends on q. Increasing q reduces the likelihood that a
decision y = 0 follows no report, and thus increases the incentive to report :
We then obtain
Proposition 13 Suppose that EDA([; 0])  0; then an equilibrium exists with q = 1 if
max ( (0);  (0))  : An equilibrium with 0 < q < 1 exists if ws([0; 0]; 0)  0 <  <
 (0):
Notice that ws([0; 0]; 0) < 0; so that the rst condition is trivially veried if 0 
  : But it is possible that a decision y = 0 be perceived as a bad signal by the market
despite a bias of the expert in favor of y = 1:
Corollary 14 There exists an equilibrium with q < 1 and ws([0; 0]; q) < 0; when 0 <
  :
The issue of existence arises if  > max ( (0);  (0)) : Then for any q > 0; the expert
would not announce a negative  slightly below 0: But we have seen that in the case
 >  (0); there is an equilibrium with sr = 0 and q = 0:
Notice that the function  is smaller than the function  so that:
Proposition 15 For any equilibrium  of the game with public report, there exists an
equilibrium of the game with secret report with sr  :
Proof. We have
 () = ws([; 0] ; 1)  
=
p(1  p)  p  p
p^ (1  p^F ())   
:
And
() = wp([; 0])  
=
(1  p) p  p  p+ 2pp
p^ (1  p^F ()  p^ (1  F (0)))   
:
This is straightforward that
 () < ():
There are three cases:
1. Either   (max (; 0)); so that misreport of negative values greater than  =
max (; 0) is an equilibrium of the game with public report. In this case, we also have
   (max (; 0)) and misreport of negative values greater than sr = max (; 0) is
an equilibrium of the game with secret report.
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2. Either  < min (); so that full reporting of negative values is the unique equilibrium
of the game with public report.
3. Either min ()   < (max (; 0)); so that () is non increasing for all  2
[max (; 0) ; Argmin ()]. In this case, as  () < (); there always exists sr
such that sr  ;  = () and  =  (sr):
This result is quite interesting because it states that when one moves from public disclo-
sure of reports to secret reports, equilibria in which the experts lie more arise. One might
thus conjecture that public disclosure of the experts report is better in terms of information
transmission. But, this need not be the case for all equilibria.
However, if we only consider the equilibrium of the game with public report in which
the expert always lie as much as possible and the one in which he reports the truth as often
as possible, the function (:) is decreasing. As noted above, those equilibria are the most
studied in order to cope with multiplicity in the information transmission literature. As
the function  is smaller than the function ; this implies that in all equilibria, the expert
will report the truth more often when reports are public than when reports are secret.
We can thus reasonably state that public disclosure of reports is optimal in order to
attain an e¢ cient decision making.
However, there exist other equilibria in which this is not the case. This is stated in the
following corollary.
Corollary 16 There exist equilibria of the games with public and secret reports such that
sr > 
:
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is thus omitted.
4.2 Consultation of Inside experts
Let us now consider as before the role of and inside expert. In the case of secret report,
when q > 0; the outside expert having signal  < 0 will report truthfully his signal when
wPr( = jy = 0) 
(1  pI) q [ + wPr( = jy = 1) + ] + (1  (1  pI) q)wPr( = jy = 0)
or
(1  pI) q [ +  + w (Pr( = jy = 1)  Pr( = jy = 0))]  0
,  +   w (Pr( = jy = 0)  Pr( = jy = 1))
We see that the situation is di¤erent than with the case of a public contract. Because the
reputation gains are directly attached to the decision and not the report, the incentive
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to report truthfully are unchanged at xed markets reactions. What changes now is the
market information. Consider the case q = 1; while a decision y = 0 can only occur with
an informed outside expert when there is no inside expert, this is not the case when there
is an inside expert. Moreover, when the DA consults an inside expert, she makes less often
the decision y = 1. Indeed, when the outside expert misreports ( 2 sr) in order to reach
decision y = 0; there is a positive probability that the inside expert reports the truth and
moves the decision to y = 1: Thus, in the case of secret reports, reputation e¤ects are
smaller when an inside expert is consulted:
w [Pr( = jy = 0)  Pr( = jy = 1)] < ws(sr; 1):
The formal derivation is made in the appendix.
The meaning of this result is that, in all pure strategy equilibria, hiring an inside expert
raises the outside experts incentives to withhold information when it is unfavorable.
We thus obtain that
Proposition 17 When expertsreports are secret and q = 1, hiring an inside expert reduces
the outside experts incentives to report truthfully.
We see that the result is reversed compared to the case of public report.
Moreover, if we use the same notations than in the section with public reports, one can
remark that the term capturing the changes in the set sr; V 1I ; is negative. Indeed, the set
of signals for which the informed outside expert decides to report no information is now
larger when the DA consults inside experts. Specically, we have VI < V 2I : Hiring an inside
expert is therefore less attractive if the reports are secret compared to the case where they
are public. Intuitively, in the case of public reports an inside expert may not only change
the decision but may also reduce the outside experts reputation. When expertsreports are
secret, the inside expert increases the reputation of the outside expert in making a report
which changes the decision. This allows an outside expert to misreport for lower values of
e¢ ciency gains since his reputation is not a¤ected even though the inside experts report
may contradict him.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the e¢ ciency of information transmission between some experts an
a decision maker under di¤erent informational features. We rst show that hiring experts
biased against the status quo always improves the e¢ ciency of the decision. Indeed, if the
decision maker were to choose a decision without any advices, an expert biased against this
decision always report the truth as this increases his reputation. The second main result is
that public disclosure of the experts report enhances information transmission. Intuitively,
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this makes misreport more costly in terms of the experts reputation. We also analyze the
impact of an inside, unbiased expert on an outside, biased expert reporting strategy. When
the expertsreports are public, we prove that the presence of the inside expert forces the
outside one to report more truthfully. However, this result is reversed in the case of secret
reports. The intuitive result that hiring an inside expert constrain other experts to reveal
the truth is therefore only true when there is public disclosure of reports.
In this paper, the private benets received by the experts when their favorite decision
is reached are common knowledge. However it is also interesting to see what happens if
those benets are private information for the experts. It should be more di¢ cult for the
authority to anticipate misreport from a biased expert. Moreover, a natural question is
whether transparency about the expertsbias is desirable for the authority.
Another extension is to build a dynamic version of this model. As experts care about
their reputation, it should be interesting to analyze repeated interactions between them
and the decision maker. This may induce a biased expert to report truthfully in order to
enhance his reputation for having a strong expertise and in this way being consulted in
future important decisions.
6 Appendix
Gain of reputation when report is public. We will rst compute the gain of reputation
when the report is public and when the expert announces an informative report, p() :
Pr(;j) = 1  p+ pPr ()
Pr(;j) = 1  p+ pPr ()
Pr(j;) = p [1  p] + ppPr ()
p [1  p] + (1  p) 1  p+  pp+ (1  p)pPr ()
Pr(infoj) = p [1  Pr ()]






pp+ (1  p)p  
p [1  p] + ppPr ()
p [1  p] + (1  p) 1  p+  pp+ (1  p)pPr ()
= (1  p) p p  p+ 2pp
p^ (1  p^ (1  Pr ()))
where p^ = (1  p)p+ pp is the ex-ante probability of the expert being informed
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Gain of reputation when report is secret. The general formulas for the gain of
reputation when the report is secret and when the DAs decision is y = 0, s(sr; q) :
s(sr; 1) =
p(1  p)  p  p
p^ (1  p^F (sr))
:
Notice that s(sr; 1) < p(sr):
Dene
H(sr; q) = qF (

sr)  (1  q) f1  F (0)g
We have
s(sr; q) =
p(1  p) (Pr (0j)  Pr (0j))
Pr (0)Pr (1)
Pr (0j) = pF (sr) + (1  q) f1  p+ p [F (0)  F (sr)]g




Pr (0) = p^F (sr) + (1  q) [1  p^+ p^ (F (0)  F (sr))]
= 1  q + p^H
Pr (1) = p^ (1  F (0)) + q [1  p^+ p^ (F (0)  F (sr))]
= q   p^H
Thus
s(sr; q) =
p(1  p)  p  pH
(1  q + p^H) (q   p^H)
And
s(sr; 1) =
p(1  p)  p  p
p^ (1  p^F (sr))
> 0
s(sr; 0) = wp(1  p)
 
p  p   (1  F (0))
(1  p^ (1  F (0))) (p^ (1  F (0))) < 0















q(1  p^H) + (p^H)2



















q(1  p^H) + (p^H)2









q(1  p^H) + (p^H)2
H (1  q + p^H) (q   p^H)
!
+
2(q   p^H)  1




q(1  p^H) + (p^H)2

+H (2(q   p^H)  1)




q   qp^H + (p^H)2

+H (2q   2p^H   1)
H (1  q + p^H) (q   p^H)
=
(1  F (0)) + ( p^Hq + 2)H (q   p^H)
H (1  q + p^H) (q   p^H) > 0
Convexity of the functions  () and  (). We now show that those functions are
convex. Lets remind that f () is non-decreasing on  < 0
 () = w
p(1  p)  p  p
p^ (1  p^F ())   
 0() = w
p(1  p)  p  p
(1  p^F ())2 f()  
 00() = w









(1 + l (F (0)  F ()))   
0() =
(0)
(1 + l (F (0)  F ()))2 lf()  
00() =
(0)




1 + l (F (0)  F ()) lf()
2

Proof of Proposition 17. Assume q = 1: Lets compute the probabilities that the
market anticipates that an outside expert is a good one given the decision.
Without inside experts, this gives for decision y = 0:
Pr (0j) = pF ()
Pr (0) = p^F ()




And, for decision y = 1:
Pr (1j) = p [1  F ()] + (1  p)
Pr (1) = 1  p^F ()
Pr (j1) = p (1  pF ())
1  p^F () :
When an inside expert is consulted, we have for decision y = 0:
Pr
I
(0j) = pF () + (1  p) pI [F (0)  F ()]
Pr
I





pF () + (1  p) pI [F (0)  F ()]
p^F () + (1  p^) pI [F (0)  F ()]

:
Finally, for decision y = 1:
Pr
I
(1j) = 1  pF ()  pI [F (0)  pF ()]
Pr
I





1  pF ()  pI [F (0)  pF ()]
1  p^F ()  pI [F (0)  p^F ()]

:
As p > p^; one can easily show that Pr
I
(j0) < Pr (j0) and that Pr
I
(j1) > Pr (j1) :
This proves that the reputation e¤ects are lower when an inside expert is consulted:
w [Pr( = jy = 0)  Pr( = jy = 1)] < ws(sr; 1):
Finally one can state the result, when expertsreports are secret and q = 1, hiring an
inside expert reduces the outside experts incentives to report truthfully.
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